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Man is inherently a political and religious being.' Our
Founding Fathers recognized this principle and sought to construct a system of government based upon the fundamental notion that religious expression must be separate from a
government's exercise of power.2 The first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States was drafted to ensure that the
federal government would not exert influence over the religious
sovereignty of its people.3 The amendment guarantees that
I See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (T. Sinclair trans. 1962).
It follows that the state belongs to a class of objects which exist in
nature, and that man is by nature a political animal; it is his nature to
live in a state. He who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no
city, no state, is either too bad or too good, either sub-human or superhuman-sub-human like the war-mad man condemned in Homer's
words "having no family, no morals, no home"; for such a person is by
his nature mad on war, he is a non-cooperator like an isolated piece in a
game of draughts. But it is not simply a matter of cooperation, for obviously man is a political animal in a sense in which a bee is not, or any
gregarious animal.
Id. at 28. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In ZorachJusticeDouglas
stated: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id. at 313. E. BURKE, SELECTED WORKS (W. Bate ed. 1960) "We know, and it
is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious animal; that atheism
is against, not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot prevail long."
Id. at 401.
2 See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 244-48 (1948) (Reed, J.,
dissenting); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 38-43 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
3 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). In Davis, the majority stated:
The first amendment to the Constitution, in declaring that Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or forbidding the free exercise thereof, was intended to allow every one under
the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions respecting
his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in
such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal
rights of others, and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any sect. The oppressive measures adopted, and the cruelties and punishments inflicted by the
governments of Europe for many ages, to compel parties to conform, in
their religious beliefs and modes of worship, to the views of the most
numerous sect, and the folly of attempting in that way to control the
mental operations of persons, and enforce an outward conformity to a
prescribed standard, led to the adoption of the amendment in question.
Id. at 342.
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"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of'religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
Interpreting the first amendment, the Supreme Court has
considered historical evidence in an attempt to apply the framers'
original intent.5 The Court's decisions, however, have served
only to further intensify the conflict between the forces of
religion and government. 6 A manifestation of this continued
struggle is Edwards v. Aguillard,7 wherein the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which required equal treatment of creationism and evolution in public
schools .8

In 1981, the Louisiana state legislature enacted the Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public
School Instruction Act (Creationism Act).' This statute prohibited the teaching of evolutionary theory in the public elementary
and secondary schools of Louisiana, unless accompanied by
equal instruction in "creation-science."' 0 No school was com4 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. The amendment states in full: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-30 (1962); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 213-21

(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-16.
6 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating Alabama statute
authorizing public schools to begin each school day with a one minute period of
silence); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating Kentucky statute requiring posting the Ten Commandments in public classrooms); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating Illinois practice of allowing religion teachers to hold thirty minute weekly sectarian classes in public school facilities). Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding Rhode Island
practice of erecting Christmas display which included a nativity scene); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding Nebraska legislature's practice of beginning each session with a prayer offered by chaplain); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding New Jersey reimbursement scheme to refund transportation costs incurred by parents of children attending private schools). For an
extended discussion of these cases, see infra notes 27-97 and accompanying text.
7 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
8 Id.
9 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982).
10 Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2575-76. The Creationism Act provides in pertinent
part:
Commencing with the 1982-1983 school year, public schools within this
state shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolutionscience. Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in textbook materials
taken as a whole for each course, in library materials taken as a whole for
the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such lectures,
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pelled by the Creationism Act to provide instruction in evolution
or creation-science." Neither theory, however, could be taught
2
to the exclusion of the other.'
A group of educators, religious leaders, and parents of Louisiana school children instituted an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Louisiana officials responsible for the implementation of the Creationism Act."
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment,
contending that the Act was invalid on its face, because it violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment.14 Conversely,
the government officials defended the constitutionality of the
Act, claiming that its purpose was to protect the secular interest
of academic freedom.15

The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion and asserted
that a statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution, or requiring
that it be accompanied by instruction in creation-science, serves
no secular interest.' 6 The court reasoned that "the teaching of
'creation-science' and 'creationism,' as contemplated by the statute, involves teaching 'tailored to the principles' of a particular
religious sect or groups of sects."' 7 Accordingly, the court held
textbooks, library materials, or educational programs deal in any way
with the subject of the origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe.
When creation or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory,
rather than as proven scientific fact.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.4(A) (West 1982).
I Edwards, 107 S.Ct. at 2576.
12 Id.
13 Id. The Louisiana officials responsible for implementing the Act included the
Governor of Louisiana, the State Attorney General, the State Department of Education, the State Superintendent, and the St. Tammany Parish School Board. See id. at
2576 n. 1. They agreed not to implement the Act until the conclusion of this litigation. Id.
14 Id. at 2576. The district court initially stayed the action pending the outcome
of a separate lawsuit instituted by the sponsor of the legislation. Id. at 2576 n.2.
Upon dismissal of the separate action, the district court lifted its stay and held that
the Act violated the Louisiana Constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, No. 82-3778 (E.D.
La. Nov. 24, 1982). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified the state
constitutional question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Aguillard v. Treen, No.
82-3778 (5th Cir. March 14, 1983). The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
Act did not violate the Louisiana State Constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So.2d
704 (La. 1983). The court of appeals then remanded the case to the district court
to consider whether the Act violated the United States Constitution. Aguillard v.
Treen, 720 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1983).
15 Edwards, 107 S.Ct. at 2576.
16 See Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 427-28 (E.D. La. 1985), aff'dsub nom.
Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 2573 (1987).
17 Aguillard, 634 F. Supp. at 427 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
106 (1968)).
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that the Creationism Act violated the establishment clause, because the Act's purpose was to advance a select religious doctrine."8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed on the same grounds'" and the United States Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction.20
Affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court
2
held that the Creationism Act violated the establishment clause. '
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that the Act
clearly advanced a theistic interest by requiring that either creation-science be taught concomitant with evolution or that evolutionary theory be banished from the curriculum of Louisiana
public schools.22 Additionally, the Justice noted that the Act
sought to utilize government funds to accomplish this religious
purpose.23

In 1940, the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut 2 4 held
the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 25 Since that time, the Court has struggled to formulate the

appropriate standards by which to adjudicate establishment
clause questions.2 6
Subsequent to Cantwell, the Court ruled on an establishment
clause challenge in the case of Everson v. Board of Education.2 7 In

Everson, the Court upheld a NewJersey reimbursement scheme in
which the transportation costs incurred by parents of children attending private schools would be refunded by the state. 28 The
18 Id. at 429. Specifically, the court noted that the Act "promot[ed] the beliefs of
some theistic sects to the detriment of others." Id.
19 Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1253 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct.
2573 (1987). The court determined that the legislative intent behind the Creationism Act was "to discredit evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn

with the teaching of creationism, a religious belief." Id. at 1257.
20 Aguillard v. Edwards, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (1986).

21 Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2584.
22 Id.

23 Id.

24 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
25 Id. at 303. In Cantwell, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state
statute which prohibited solicitation for religious purposes without a duly procured
certificate. Id. at 303. The Court determined that such statute was an unconstitutional restraint on free exercise of religion and a deprivation of due process in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
26 See infra notes 27-97 and accompanying text.
27 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

28 Id. at 3. Specifically, the state statute authorized local school districts to enter
contracts and promulgate rules for the transportation of children to and from private schools. Id. Pursuant to this statute, a local school board of education author-
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Court's inquiry focused upon whether the contested law was neutral with regard to religion.29 The majority reasoned that the disputed legislation was indeed neutral, because parents of all
private school children were reimbursed irrespective of their religious affiliation.3 ' Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court
noted that the wall of separation between church and state "must
31
be kept high and impregnable.
A fractured Court in Everson realigned in McCollum v. Board of

Education3 2 to examine rights granted under the first amendment.33 In McCollum, the Court considered the constitutionality
of an Illinois practice of permitting sectarian teachers to hold
weekly classes in religious instruction in lieu of compulsory secular education at public school facilities. 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Black first noted that pupils are required by law to
attend school for a secular education. 3 5 The Justice then reasoned that Illinois' scheme was, without question, a use of public
funds employed to aid sectarian groups in propagating their beliefs. 36 Thus,-Justice Black concluded that the practice was
unconstitutional.
ized the reimbursement for bus transportation costs to parents of parochial school
children. Id. A district taxpayer challenged the reimbursement scheme as violative
of the New Jersey and United States Constitutions. Id. at 3-4.
29 Id. at 18.
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
33 In Everson, Justices Rutledge, Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton dissented. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). A year later in McCollum, the Justices
who had dissented in Everson concurred in the result reached by the majority. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
34 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 207-09. Under this plan, representatives from the
Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant faiths gave religious instruction in public school
buildings once a week. Id. at 208-09. The Champaign Council on Religious Education, an independent body composed of concerned members of the Jewish, Protestant and Roman Catholic faiths, hired the religious teachers. Id. at 207. The
Council obtained the school board's permission to offer these religion classes once
a week to grades four through nine. Id. If a child's parent requested that the child
be excused from secular classes, the pupil was required to attend the religion
classes. Id. at 207-09. Students not wishing to attend the religious classes, however, were required to attend the regularly scheduled secular classes. Id. at 209.
35 Id. at 209-10.
36 Id. at 210.
37 Id. In so holding, the Court explained that:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force or influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion .... No tax in any amount, large or
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter stressed the importance of public schools by stating that as "the most powerful
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people, the public school must keep scrupulously free from
entanglement in the strife of sects."3' 8 Thus, the McCollum case,
decided two years after Everson, illustrated a marked change in
the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause. 9
In 1961, in Engel v. Vitale,4 ° the Court held unconstitutional
the New York practice of beginning each day of public school
class with the recitation of a state composed nondenominational
prayer. 4 Summarizing the Court's position, Justice Black stated
that New York's practice of beginning each school day with an
invocation of God's blessing undoubtedly constituted a religious
activity. 42 Conspicuously absent from the majority's opinion,
however, were any references to the yardstick employed by the
Court to arrive at its conclusion.4 3
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion once again brought the
concept of neutrality to the forefront.4 4 The Justice posited that
religious interests are better served when a government assumes
a neutral posture with regard to religion.4 5 Significantly, Justice
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion neither a state nor a Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 210-11 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1947)).
38 Id. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Reed filed a dissent calling
for a less rigid interpretation of the establishment clause and pointed to the "history of past practices" in concluding that the Illinois practice should be upheld. Id.
at 256 (Reed, J., dissenting).
39 Compare McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209-12 with Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-18.
40 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
41 Id. at 422-24. The prayer recited in unison by the students at the beginning
of each school day read as follows:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.
Id. at 422. The prayer was composed by the State Board of Regents, a governmental agency created in accordance with New York's Constitution. Id. at 422-23. The
Board maintained supervisory power over the New York public school system. Id.
42 Id. at 424.
43 See id. at 424-36.
44 Id. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring).
45 Id. Justice Douglas reasoned:
The First Amendment leaves the Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality. The philosophy is that the atheist or
agnostic-the nonbeliever-is entitled to go his own way. The philosophy is that if government interferes in matters spiritual, it will be a divi-
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Douglas also noted that the Everson case, decided sixteen
years
46
earlier, was "out of line with the First Amendment.

Building upon Justice Douglas' concept of neutrality, the
Court in Abington School District v. Schempp,4 7 formulated a new

standard for evaluating state legislation under the establishment
clause. 48 In Schempp, the Court assessed the validity of a Pennsylvania statute requiring the reading of a selected passage from
the Bible each school morning.49 The law, however, allowed a
child to be excused from participation upon formal written request by a parent or legal guardian. 50 In considering the constitutionality of this state-sponsored practice, the Court
embellished upon the Everson "neutrality" standard by formulating a new two-prong test.5" The Schempp Court stated that an
enactment must have both "a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion" in order to pass constitutional muster under the establishment
clause.52 Utilizing this two-prong standard, the Schempp Court invalidated the Pennsylvania statute as violative of the first amendment.53 Clearly, this stringent two-prong standard evidenced a
shift in the Court to a more scrutinizing view towards legislation
seeking to weaken "the wall of separation between church and
54
state."

sive force. The First Amendment teaches that a government neutral in
the field of religion better serves all religious interests.
Id.
46 Id. Justice Douglas noted that "[the result of the Everson case] is appealing, as
it allows aid to be given to needy children. Yet by the same token, public funds
could be used to satisfy other needs of children in parochial schools-lunches,
books, and tuition being obvious examples." Id.
47 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 205.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 222.
52 Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
53 Id. at 226-27.
54 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Connecticut Baptist Association
(Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON (1943). Thomas
Jefferson was the first to use the phrase "wall of separation between church and
state." The letter states in pertinent part:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only,
and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
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The Court employed the two-prong standard formulated in
Schempp five years later in Epperson v. Arkansas.5 5 In Epperson, the
Court struck down an Arkansas statute which made it unlawful
for a teacher in a public school or university to teach the evolutionary theory of man. 56 Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas
determined that the first amendment does not allow the state to
mandate that teaching and learning be tailored to the tenets or
principles of any religious sect. 57 Applying the test articulated in
Schempp, the Court reasoned that the sole purpose of the Arkansas law was to further the religious account of the origin of man
as explained in the Book of Genesis. 58 Accordingly, the Epperson
Court concluded that the Act clearly failed to meet the first
59
amendment requirements of government neutrality.
Three years later, in the seminal case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,6 °
the Supreme Court formulated a tripartite test to resolve establishment clause issues. 6 ' In Lemon, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania and a Rhode Island statute which
both provided state aid to parochial elementary and secondary
schools.6 2 ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the majority, articulated a new standard which expanded upon the existing approach
for scrutinizing establishment clause questions.6 3 In addition to
requiring that a statute have a secular purpose and possess the
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the
nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction that progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man

all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to
his social duties.

I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and blessing of
the common Father and Creator of man, and tender you for yourselves
and your religious association, assurances of my high respect and
esteem.
Id. at 518-19.

55 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
56 Id. at 109.
57 Id. at 106.
58 Id. at 107-09 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222

(1963)).
59 Id. at 109.
60 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
61 See Lenon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.

62 Id. at 606. Pennsylvania's program provided financial support to nonpublic
schools by reimbursing their costs for teachers' salaries, textbooks and other materials used in secular courses. Id. at 606-07. Under the Rhode Island statutory
scheme, the state supplemented 15% of nonpublic school teacher salaries. Id. at
607.
63 d. at 612-13.
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principal effect of neutrality, the Lemon Court also held that the
statute must not constitute "an excessive government entanglement with religion.

' 64

Applying this test to both state statutes,

the Court concluded that "the cumulative impact of the entire
relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion," and
therefore, failed to meet the newly formulated third criterion.6 5
Following Lemon, the tripartite test has become the benchmark
against which many establishment clause cases have been
analyzed. 66
Nearly a decade later, in Stone v. Graham,6 v the Court decided
the constitutionality of a Kentucky statute requiring the posting
of a copy of the Ten Commandments in all public classrooms in
the state.68 Employing the Lemon criteria, the Court rejected the
Kentucky legislature's articulation of a secular purpose and held
the statute unconstitutional. 69 Further, the Court determined
Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
Id. at 614.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-85 (1984) (application of tripartite test to uphold city sponsored creche display); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116 (1982) (application of tripartite test to ban church power to regulate liquor licensing); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980) (application of tripartite test to uphold funding to private schools). But
see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (suggesting Lemon test is only an aid
in analysis); Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (utilizing historical analysis to uphold legislature prayer). At least one commentator has criticized the
Court's inconsistent application of the Lemon test. See Choper, The Religious Clauses
of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 680 (1980).
67 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
68 The Kentucky statute provided:
(1) It shall be the duty of the superintendent of public instruction,
provided sufficient funds are available as provided in subsection (3) of
this Section, to ensure that a durable, permanent copy of the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a wall in each public elementary and
secondary school classroom in the Commonwealth. The copy shall be
sixteen (16) inches wide by twenty (20) inches high.
(2) In small print below the last commandment shall appear a notation concerning the purpose of the display, as follows: "The secular
application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as
the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common
Law of the United States."
(3) The copies required by this Act shall be purchased with funds
made available through voluntary contributions made to the state treasurer for the purposes of this Act.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980) (declared unconstitutional in
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980)).
69 Stone, 449 U.S. at 40-41. In its analysis of the constitutionality of the statute,
the Court noted that "[t]he pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten Commandments
64
65
66
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that the only possible effect of the texts would "be to induce the
schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and
obey, the Commandments." ' 0 The Court also noted, however,
that it might be constitutionally permissible to incorporate the
Ten Commandments into secular subjects such as history, civilization, or comparative religion.7 '
Justice Rehnquist filed a scathing dissent in which he criticized the Court's failure to accept the Kentucky legislature's articulation of a secular purpose.7 2 According to the Justice, the
majority's outright rejection of the stated purpose did not afford
the legislative pronouncements the deference they deserved.7 3
By stating that "[t]he Establishment Clause does not require that
the public sector be insulated from all things which may have a
religious significance or origin,"7 4 Justice Rehnquist expressed a
viewpoint which foreshadowed the outcome of subsequent establishment clause decisions.
Thus, in the 1983 case of Marsh v. Chambers,7 5 the Court
adopted, to a limited extent, the position expressed by Justice
Rehnquist in Stone.7 6 In Marsh, the Court upheld the validity of a
Nebraska practice of beginning each legislative session with a
prayer recited by a chaplain. 77 In so doing, the Court did not
apply the Lemon tripartite test, but instead relied upon historical
precedent with regard to this matter.7 8 The Court reasoned that
the authors of the first amendment did not view paid chaplains
reciting opening prayers as unconstitutional because the practice
had continued without interruption since the initial congresare undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Id. at 41 (footnote omitted).
70 Id. at 42.
71 Id. (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)).
72 See id.at 43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Historically, the Court has accepted
the secular purpose of a statute as stated by the legislature. See, e.g., Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (accepting New York Legislature's
stated secular purpose behind statute granting financial aid to nonpublic schools);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (deferring to stated secular purpose
of statute supplementing salaries of private school teachers); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (accepting New York Legislature's stated secular purpose behind statute authorizing loan of textbooks to private schools).
73 See Stone, 449 U.S. at 43-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 45-46.
75 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
76 See id. at 784.
77 Id. The chaplain was chosen by the Executive Board of the Legislative Council and his salary was subsidized through public funds. Id. at 784-85.
78 Id. at 788.
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sional session.7 9 Furthermore, the Marsh Court noted that the
two hundred year tradition of commencing legislative sessions
with prayer "has become part of the fabric of our society." '
In dissent, Justice Brennan abandoned his previous position
in Schempp, where he noted that invocational prayers at legislative
sessions were not prohibited by the establishment clause. 8 ' Reasoning that Nebraska's practice clearly failed all three criteria set
forth in Lemon, Justice Brennan stated that "[flor my purposes,
however, I must begin by demonstrating what should be obvious:
that, if the Court were to judge legislative prayer through the unsentimental eye of our settled doctrine, it would have to82strike it
down as a clear violation of the Establishment Clause."
Similarly, the case of Lynch v. Donnelly8" illustrates the
Court's willingness to relax its application of the Lemon tripartite
test when certain traditional practices are involved.8 4 In Lynch,
the residents of Pawtucket, Rhode Island challenged the city's
practice of erecting a Christmas display, which included a nativity
scene in a park owned by a nonprofit organization.8 5 Writing for
the majority, ChiefJustice Burger applied the Lemon test and concluded that the city's display of the creche did not violate the establishment clause.8 6 Evaluating the purpose behind the city's
action, the Lynch Court reasoned that the celebration of the holiday season by Pawtucket was secular in nature.8 7 Further, the
79

Id.

80 Id. at 792.

81 See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299-300 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). In his concurrence in Schempp, Justice Brennan stated:
[Tihe saying of invocational prayers in legislative chambers, state or federal, and the appointment of legislative Chaplains, might well represent
no involvement of the kind prohibited by the Establishment Clause.
Legislators, federal and state, are mature adults who may presumably
absent themselves from such public and ceremonial exercises without
incurring any penalty, direct or indirect.
Id. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his dissent in Marsh, Justice Brennan
stated that: "After much reflection, I have come to the conclusion that I was wrong
then and that the Court is wrong today. I now believe that the practice of official
invocational prayer, as it exists in Nebraska and most other state legislatures is unconstitutional." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
84 See id. at 672-87.
85 Id. at 671. The Christmas display included a Santa Claus house, candy-cane
poles, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, a Christmas tree, cut-out figures representing
clowns, carolers, elephants, teddy bears, hundreds of colored lights, a "SEASONS
GREETINGS" banner, as well as the creche at issue. Id.
86 Id. at 679-87.
87 Id. at 680-81. The Court reasoned that:
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Court concluded that the creche, when viewed in the context of
the overall Christmas display, did not impermissibly benefit religion, and therefore, it satisfied the second prong of the Lemon
test."8 Noting that the city of Pawtucket did not consult with
church authorities as to the design or content of the creche, the
Court concluded that the activity did not create an excessive entanglement between church and state.8 9
Justice Brennan, in a stinging dissent, criticized the Court's
"less-than-vigorous application of the Lemon test ....

"-

Ques-

tioning the majority's commitment to the principles espoused by
the test, Justice Brennan stated further that the holding in Lynch
was irreconcilable with prior decisions. 9 ' He reasoned that the
city's practice was "a coercive . . . step toward establishing the

sectarian preferences of the majority at the expense of the minority" by utilizing public funds to support theological tidings conveyed by the creche. 92
Decided in 1985, the case of Wallace v. Jaffree93 represents a
return by the Court to the standard of scrutiny employed in cases
prior to Marsh and Lynch. In Wallace, the Court considered the
constitutionality of an Alabama statute authorizing public schools
to initiate each day of classes with a one minute moment of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer." 94 Authoring the majority opinion, Justice Stevens found that the statute was wholly
motivated by a religious purpose, and therefore, it failed the first
prong of the Lemon test. 95 Accordingly, the Court held the statWhen viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday season, it
is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish
that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to
express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message. In a pluralistic society a variety of motives and purposes
are implicated. The city, like the Congresses and Presidents, however,
has principally taken note of a significant historical religious event long
celebrated in the Western World. The creche in the display depicts the
historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National
Holiday.
Id. at 680 (citations omitted).
88 Id. at 681-83.
89 Id. at 683-84.
90 Id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91 See id. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 725-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor filed a concurring
opinion in which she suggested abandoning the first criterion of the Lemon test. Id.
at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
94 Id. at 43 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
95 Id. at 56.
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ute to be unconstitutional.9 6 The Court, however, did not determine that all statutes falling under the rubric of "moment of
silence" would be per se unconstitutional under the establishment clause.9 7
The evolution of establishment clause litigation underscores
the prominent role assumed by Edwards. Recent cases display the
Court's uncertainty in determining how strictly the establishment
clause must be construed.9" The Edwards Court, however,
evinced a general willingness by the majority to apply strict scrutiny to a contested statute within the parameters of the Lemon
test.9 9
Assessing the validity of the Creationism Act, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, first noted the considerable discretion afforded to state and local school boards in operating public
schools.' 0 Recognizing that the Court has been "particularly
vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause
in elementary and secondary schools," Justice Brennan emphasized that in employing the tripartite test enunciated in Lemon,
the Court must be especially cognizant of the specific concerns
existing in the context of public educational institutions.' 0 ' Ap96 Id. Justice Stevens, in reaching this conclusion referred to the stated purpose
of the bill as expressed by its sponsor, Senator Holmes. In answer to the question
regarding whether there was any purpose for the act other than the introduction of
prayer into public schools, Senator Holmes commented that he did not have a different purpose in mind. Id. at 57 (footnote omitted).
97 See id. at 58-59. In his concurrence, Justice Powell stated: "I agree fully with
Justice O'Connor's assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, a suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well." Id. at 62 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted). In a separate concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor stated:
A state-sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different from state-sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment
of silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible
reading, need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or
her beliefs. During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer
is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of
silence statute does not stand or fall under the Establishment Clause
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer or Bible reading.
Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98 See supra notes 27-97 and accompanying text.
"9 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577-78 (1987).
100 Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577 (citing Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106
S. Ct. 3159 (1986)).
101 Id. at 2577-78. In assuming this position, the Court observed that parents
entrust the public school system with the education of their children and do so
under the belief that the classroom will not intentionally advance religious views
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plying the first prong of the Lemon test, the Court concluded that
the purpose of the legislation was to advance the viewpoint that a
supernatural being created mankind.' 0 2 Finding no merit in the
Act's stated purpose of protecting academic freedom, the Court
reasoned that the "goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered either by outlawing the teaching
'
of evolution or by requiring the teaching of creation science.""03
Conceding that the Court is normally deferential to a legislature's proffered secular purpose, the Court noted that such deference is only accorded when
the statement of such purpose is
"sincere and not a sham."' 0 4 After examining the legislative history of the Creationism Act, the Court concluded that the ban on
teaching did not further, but rather undermined the promotion
of a comprehensive scientific education. 10 5 Thus, since the purpose of the Act in question was "to restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint," the Court
held that the Act violated the first prong of the Lemon test.' 0 6 In
so holding, however, Justice Brennan recognized the value in
teaching certain religious beliefs and emphasized that it may be
validly done if the program evinces the secular purpose of improving the efficacy of science instruction. 0 7 Louisiana's Act, according to Justice Brennan, did not achieve this constitutionally
permissible objective. 108

In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that the language of the Creationism Act must first be examined to deterthat may conflict with the religious beliefs of the child and his or her family. Id. at
2577. Furthermore, the Court recognized that students are impressionable and
susceptible to peer pressure. Id. Accordingly, the Court posited that "[i]n no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools .... "
Id. at 2578 (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)).
102 Id. at 2578-81.
103 Id. at 2578-79.
104 Id. at 2579 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
105

Id. at 2579. Arriving at this conclusion, the Court reasoned:
If the Louisiana legislature's purpose was solely to maximize the
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction, it would
have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories about the origins
of humankind. But under the Act's requirements, teachers who were
once free to teach any and all facets of this subject are now unable to do
so.

Id. at 2580 (footnote omitted).
106 Id. at 2584.
107

Id. at 2582-83.

108 Id.
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mine whether a secular purpose exists.109 Noting that the
purpose of "academic freedom" offered by the legislature was
ambiguous, the Justice proceeded to examine the legislative
history of the statute." 0 Justice Powell concluded that the Louisiana legislature intended to promote a particular religious belief
system and determined, therefore, that the Act was
unconstitutional. " '
In conclusion, Justice Powell recognized the authority of
state and local school boards to formulate the education policies
of public schools." 2 According to Justice Powell, interference
with a school board's authority is warranted only when the purpose for its decision is "clearly religious." " The Justice posited
that school children "can and should properly be informed of all
aspects of [our] Nation's religious heritage," as long as such instruction is not intended to promote a particular religious
belief."' 4
Justice White filed a concurring opinion in which he advocated the Court's practice of deferring to a lower court's interpretation of a state statute." 5 TheJustice postulated that district
courts and courts of appeals are proper forums for interpreting
legislation originating in their own states.i 16 Accordingly, he asserted that where a court of appeals arrives at a rational construc109 Id. at 2585 (Powell,J., concurring) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
to Id. at 2586 (Powell, J., concurring).
II Id. at 2586-88 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell noted that the Louisiana legislature relied on presentations by the Institute for Creation Research and
on the Creation Research Society, inter alia, in formulating the legislation. Id. at
2587-88 (Powell,J., concurring). Justice Powell also noted that both groups sought
to revive the belief "in special creation as the true explanation of the origin of the
world," and that both groups believed that the biblical accounts of creation were
scientifically and historically correct. Id. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring). The Justice concluded that there was "no persuasive evidence in the legislative history" to
warrant a finding that the legislature had a secular purpose in enacting the legislation. Id. at 2588 (Powell, J., concurring).
112 Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 893 (1982)).
1'3 Id. at 2589 (Powell, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 2589-90 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell noted:
I would see no constitutional problem if school children were taught the
nature of the Founding Father's religious beliefs and how these beliefs
affected the attitudes of the times and the structure of our government.
Courses in comparative religion of course are customary and constitutionally appropriate.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
''5 See id. at 2590-91 (White, J., concurring).
116 Id. at 2591 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500
(1985)).
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tion of a statute, the Supreme Court should accept that lower
court's determination. 117 In Justice White's opinion, both the
district court and court of appeals properly determined that the
Act's purpose was to advance religion." 8 Therefore, the
Supreme Court should have accepted the lower court's interpretation of the Act without conducting further inquiry." 9
Justice Scalia, in a spirited dissent, expressed his disapproval
of the Court's examination of the Louisiana legislature's purpose
for enacting the Creationism Act.' 20 The Justice contended that
by rejecting the legislature's stated secular purpose for enacting
the Act, the majority essentially held that the Louisiana legislators had violated their oaths to uphold the federal constitution
"and then lied about it.'' 1 2 Justice Scalia stated further that invalidation under the purpose prong of Lemon is only appropriate
when the statute is undoubtedly motivated solely by religious
considerations. 122 Therefore, the Justice reasoned that the majority should only have invalidated the Creationism Act if the
Louisiana legislature had undeniably no secular purpose in enacting the statute. 123
Justice Scalia stressed that the purpose prohibited by the
Lemon test is that of advancing religion. ' 24 TheJustice contended
further that the establishment clause does not preclude legislators from acting upon their religious beliefs, but allows religious
men and women to participate in the political process. 125 Embracing the dynamics of religion, he noted that "[tioday's religious activism may give us the [Creationism] Act, but yesterday's
resulted in the abolition of slavery, and tomorrow's may bring
1
relief for famine victims."'

26

Demonstrating a strong conviction that states should have
autonomy in their own affairs, Justice Scalia noted that invalidation of a statute approved by the duly elected representatives of
the people is a serious matter. 127 The Justice stressed that the
cardinal principle guiding the Court in reviewing state legislation
117 Id. (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1985)).
118

Id.

119 See id.
120
121
122
123
124

See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2591-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2593 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2594 (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
Id. (citations omitted).
ld.

125
126 Id.
127

Id. at 2600 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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"is to save and not to destroy. "128 When confronted with two
possible interpretations of an act, Justice Scalia believed that it is
the Court's duty to choose the alternative which would result in
upholding the legislation.1 29 Coupling the Louisiana legislature's explicitly stated secular purpose of "protecting academic
freedom" in the text of the Act, with its legislative history, Justice
Scalia reasoned that the statute should survive Lemon's purpose
test.'3 ° The Justice attributed the majority's willingness to invalidate the Louisiana Act to "an intellectual predisposition created
by the facts and legend of Scopes v. State . . .- an instinctive reaction that any governmentally imposed requirements bearing
upon the teaching of evolution must be a manifestation of Christian fundamentalist repression. " 13 Justice Scalia described the
majority's position as an "illiberal judgment" in that it was based
upon "Scopes-in-reverse" biases. 32
Perhaps the most important point raised by Justice Scalia is
the fallibility of the purpose prong of the Lemon test.' 33 Citing
numerous possible motivational factors, the Justice recognized
that discerning a legislator's subjective ratiocination for enacting
a statute is a Sisyphean task.' 34 Therefore, Justice Scalia stated
that to search for the unitary purpose behind a legislature's action is "to look for something that does not exist. '"135 Noting the
inherent deficiency in Lemon's purpose prong, Justice Scalia suggested that it should be replaced by a standard which would be
128 Id. (quoting National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Senator Keith, the sponsor of the legislation explained academic freedom as a student's freedom from indoctrination. See
id.
131 Id. at 2604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289
S.W. 363 (1927)).
132 Id.
133 See id. at 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia credited the purpose
prong of Lemon with creating a "maze of the Establishment Clause.
... Id. He
further stated that the Court has held:
Government may not act with the purpose of advancing religion, except
when forced to do so by the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and
then); or when eliminating existing governmental hostility to religion
(which exists sometimes); or even when merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices, except that at some point (it is
unclear where) intentional accommodation results in the fostering of
religion, which is of course unconstitutional.
Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

1989]

NOTE

137

36
pellucid and would produce predictable results.'
The Lemon test has served the Court well in adjudicating establishment clause litigation for over seventeen years.' 3 7 It has
proven to be a valuable yardstick in measuring the validity of any
contested act which potentially weakens the "wall of separation
between church and state."'' 3 8 Questioning the efficacy of the
first prong of Lemon, Justice Scalia echoed the disenchantment
voiced by Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist in previous opinions. 139 Isolating the sole purpose of a law-making body in enacting a statute has proven to be an elusive goal. Yet, to abandon
this, or any other prong of Lemon, would be a radical departure
from precedent. Thus, the Lemon standard should evolve in a
manner that will enable it to meet the current demands being
placed upon this test. This evolution is consistent with the wellrecognized axiom that the Constitution is amenable to everchanging interpretations.
If the Lemon test becomes unworkable, an alternative approach would be to institute a balancing test which would retain
the three existing prongs of Lemon. Balancing tests are traditionally employed in the adjudication of constitutional issues. Courts
have developed various balancing tests to scrutinize diverse types
of contested legislation.' 4 ° Applying this analysis to establish136

See id. at 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

137 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

The Court has relied upon the
Lemon test, to some extent, in all establishment clause contests from 1971 to the
present, with the exception of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Id.
138 See supra note 54.
'39 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
1Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (utilizing balancing
test to evaluate constitutionality of state statute regulating length of trains). In
Southern Pacific, Justice Stone observed:

[Tihe matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent
of the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as
a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights of the state and national interests involved are such as to
make inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the
commerce clause from state interference.
Id. at 770-71. See also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (utilizing
balancing test to evaluate constitutionality of ordinance regulating sale of pasteurized milk); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (utilizing balancing test
to evaluate constitutionality of statute regulating the importation of milk); Baldwin
v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (utilizing balancing test to evaluate constitutionality
of state statute prohibiting importation of milk).
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ment clause litigation would permit a prudent and scholarly examination of all competing concerns.
In its application of the Lemon test, the Edwards Court recognized that the stated purpose of an act, albeit important, is not
wholly indicative of true legislative intention.14 1 The stated purpose should be the starting point of any establishment clause
analysis. Yet, the Edwards Court went beyond the letter of the
statute and made an independent determination as to the validity
of its stated purpose. Such review must entail, among other
things, scrutinizing the legislative history and examining the language of the statute. Employing this process, the Edwards Court
protected the first amendment interests threatened by the Creationism Act.
Constitutional compliance, however, can only be established
by ascertaining the ultimate impact of the legislation. Regardless
of whether an act appears to be facially valid, if the ultimate impact of the statute advances or inhibits religion, it must be struck
down. For as James Madison wrote over two hundred years ago
in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, "[w]ho does not see that the same authority which can
establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish, with the same ease, any particular sect of Christians, in
exclusion of all other sects?"' 4 2
CharlesJoseph Sgro
141 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 64 (Powell, J., concurring).
142
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